Schumpeter and the essence of profit by Kakarot-Handtke, Egmont
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Schumpeter and the essence of profit
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
29. May 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31176/
MPRA Paper No. 31176, posted 29. May 2011 14:50 UTC
SCHUMPETER AND THE ESSENCE
OF PROFIT
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
Abstract
Schumpeter had a clear vision of the developing economy, but he did not
formalize it. The quest for a germane formal basis is in the following guided
by the general question: what is the minimum set of foundational propositions
for a consistent reconstruction of the evolving money economy? We start
with three structural axioms. The claim of generality entails that it should be
possible to free Schumpeter’s approach from its irksome Walrasian legacy and
to give a consistent formal account of the elementary circular flow that served
him as a backdrop for the analysis of the entrepreneur-driven market system.
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In expanding old horizons Schumpeter achieved a lot, in fact, ‘few of his predeces-
sors, contemporaries, or successors could claim to have done more’ (W. W. in Allen,
1991, p. xvi). His scientific work was guided by the vision of a coherent formal
theory to explain the dynamics of the market system:
The highest ambition an economist can entertain who believes in the
scientific character of economics would be fulfilled as soon as he
succeeded in constructing a simple model displaying all the essential
features of the economic process by means of a reasonably small
number of equations connecting a reasonably small number of variables.
Work on this line is laying the foundations of the economics of the
future . . . (Schumpeter, 1946, p. 3); see also (1970, pp. 624-626)
Since Schumpeter addressed his appeal to the economists of his time, thus indicating
that he was still on the quest for what he regarded as the golden fleece of theoretical
economics, it is somewhat paradoxical to reprimand him for not having finished the
job himself:
. . . Schumpeter never succeeded in working out a precise mathematical
formulation of his approach, a failure for which he has been criticized
. . . . (Stolper, 1988, p. 14)
Schumpeter wrote extensively about methodology, about the respective merits of
the inductive and the deductive method (1970, p. xv), about the ‘helplessness of
mere observation’, and the necessity of gaining ‘a definite point of view based on
principles before approaching individual groups of facts’ (1954, pp. 24, 27). He
summarized the pursuit of pure theory taking the classics as a reference:
Their [the classical economists’] achievements therefore were analyti-
cal and it is this which is usually meant by the most unfortunate terms
‘deductive’, ‘abstract’, ‘aprioristic’. Their chief aim was to order intel-
lectually and to clarify the day to day happenings in the economy in
order to arrive at an axiomatic understanding of its basic factors. (1954,
p. 90)
By virtue of his comprehensive knowledge of both economic theory and history
Schumpeter had an informed understanding of the scientific process: ‘The first item
to be mentioned is the economists’ Vision of the economic process’ (1994, p. 892).
Analytical work begins with material provided by our vision of things and this is
where a box of theoretical and statistical tools is needed (1994, pp. 42, 44). Parts of
those tools are ‘hypotheses or axioms or postulates or assumptions or even principles’
(1994, p. 15), the remaining part consisting of the pertinent formal apparatus (1994,
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p. 955). Schumpeter provided a verbalized vision of how the evolving money
economy works. His own priority was not the application of mathematical tools.
He knew them, appreciated them and he encouraged formalization:
Those who had the good fortune to know him personally report that
he was always interested in a more precise and formal version of his
theory. Competition among those trying to formalize and/or extend his
theories is certainly in harmony with his desire. (Hanusch, 1988, p. 7)
The present paper contributes to this competition.
1 The Case for Axiomatization
J. S. Mill clearly enunciated the question than stands at the beginning of any and
every scientific inquiry:
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without
proof? That there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since
there cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. But to determine what these propositions are, is the opus
magnum of the more recondite mental philosophy. (Mill, 2006, p. 746),
original emphasis
The first one to undertake the opus magnum pursuant to Euclid’s paradigm was
Senior:
To Senior belongs the signal honor of having been the first to make
the attempt to state, consciously and explicitly, the postulates that are
necessary and sufficient in order to build up . . . that little analytic
apparatus commonly known as economic theory, or to put it differently,
to provide for it an axiomatic basis. (1994, p. 575)
In the 1960s Debreu radicalized and completed the ongoing axiomatization of
the Walrasian approach (Debreu, 1959, p. x). Whether the project of Wald, von
Neumann, Debreu, Arrow, McKenzie, Hahn, and others has met with success is no
longer an open question. It is plain that ‘anything based on this mock-up is unlikely
to fly’ (Hahn, 1981, p. 1036), see also (Ackerman, 2004), (Kirman, 1989, p. 126).
Post-Keynesians and heterodox economists as complementary group mostly
rebut the ‘deductivist Euclidean methodology’ recommend a more pluralistic ap-
proach, and propose to give up the ‘Euclidean hope’ (Pålsson Syll, 2010, p. 52). Yet
from the argument that the neoclassical behavioral axioms are unqualified does not
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logically follow that the axiomatic method is useless or inappropriate in economics.
An outstanding proponent of axiomatization like Poincaré simply did not accept
Walras’s behavioral hypotheses of selfishness and farsightedness as axioms (Kirman,
2009, p. 82). It only follows that some economists have not applied the method
correctly, for whatever reasons (Hudson, 2010, pp. 15-16).
The crucial point is not axiomatization per se but the real world content of
axioms. The specific thesis to start with suggests itself: neither neoclassical nor
Keynesian economics possess, for quite different reasons, a satisfactory axiomatic
basis, and heterodox economists erroneously maintain that they need none. In this
they markedly differ from Schumpeter.
The general thesis of the present paper is that human behavior does not yield to
the axiomatic method, yet the axiomatization of the money economy’s fundamental
structure is feasible. By choosing objective structural relationships as axioms
behavioral hypotheses are not ruled out. On the contrary, the structural axiom set is
open to any behavioral assumption and not restricted to the standard optimization
calculus.
The present paper has three parts. The formal ground is prepared in sections
2 to 4. The analytical starting point, Schumpeter’s ‘reasonably small number of
equations connecting a reasonably small number of variables’, is given with the
structural axiom set which represents the pure consumption economy. In sections
5 to 7 the definition of profit is introduced and its implications unfolded. The
distinction between profit and distributed profit is crucial for the analysis of the
functioning of the money economy. Standard profit theory is known to be incoherent
(Desai, 2008), hence a new conceptual approach is in order.
In the main part, sections 8 to 12 the real world implications of the axioms are
made explicit. The structural axiom set is consistently applied to one of Schum-
peter’s central themes, that is, the impact of process innovation on profits and the
economy’s structure.
Section 13 concludes.
2 Axioms
The first three axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in a period of
arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is conveniently
assumed to be the calendar year. It can be shown that the applicability of the axiom
set does not depend on the chosen period length. Simplicity demands that we have
for the time being one world economy, one firm, and one product. Quantitative and
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qualitative differentiation is obviously the next logical step after having worked out
the implications of the following three axioms1.
Total income of the household sector Y is the sum of wage income, i.e. the
product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the product
of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Yt =WtLt +DtNt (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
Ot = RtLt (2)
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X.
Ct = PtXt (3)
A set of axioms cannot be assessed ex ante, because the full range of implications
is not immediately transparent. Self-evidence is neither necessary nor sufficient
(Popper, 1980, pp. 71-72). Hence a set of axioms is either agreed upon as a tentative
formal starting point or prematurely rejected out of hand. The assessment of axioms
comes at the second stage with the interpretation of the logical implications of the
formal world and the comparison with selected data and phenomena of the real
world. Axioms should have an intuitive economic interpretation (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 2007, p. 25), (Chick, 1998, pp. 1860-1861). The economic meaning
is rather obvious for the set of structural axioms. What deserves mention is that
total income in eq. (1) is the sum of wage income and distributed profit and not of
wage income and profit. Profit and distributed profit are quite different things that
have to be thoroughly kept apart.
3 Definitions
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms (Boylan and
O’Gorman, 2007, p. 431). With (4) factor income YF, which is at the moment
identical with wage income, and distributed profit income YD is defined:
YFt ≡WtLt YDt ≡ DtNt (4)
1 Differentiation ultimately leads to a structural axiomatic theory of value (Kakarot-Handtke, 2011b,
pp. 5-7).
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With (5) the expenditure ratio rE, the sales ratio rX, the distributed profit ratio
rD, and the factor cost ratio rF is defined:
ρEt≡
Ct
Yt
ρXt≡
Ot
Xt
ρDt≡
YDt
YFt
ρFt≡
Wt
PtRt
(5)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical
context of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
4 The Absolute Formal Minimum
The axioms and definitions are consolidated to one single equation:
ρF ρE (1+ρD)
ρX
= 1 |t (6)
The period core (6) determines the interdependencies of the measurable key
ratios for each period. The period core is purely structural, i.e., free of any behavioral
assumptions, unit-free, because all real and nominal dimensions cancel out2, and
contingent. Contingency means that it is open until explicitly stated which of the
variables are independent and which is dependent. The form of eq. (6) precludes any
notion of causality; it simply states the interdependence of the key ratios. The period
core represents the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment expenditures,
no foreign trade, and no taxes or any other state activity.
The factor cost ratio rF summarizes the internal conditions of the firm. A value
of rF <1 signifies that the real wage is lower than the productivity or, in other words,
that unit wage costs are lower than the price, or in still other words, that the value of
output exceeds the value of input. In this case the profit per unit is positive. Then
we have the conditions in the product market. An expenditure ratio rE =1 indicates
that consumption expenditures are equal to income and a value of rX =1 of the sales
ratio means that the quantities produced and sold are equal in period t or, in other
words, that the product market is cleared. In the special case rE =1 and rX =1, that
invokes the notion of an equilibrium with market clearing and budget balancing, the
profit per unit is determined solely by the distributed profit ratio rD. In one sentence:
the period core covers the key ratios about the firm, the market, and the income
distribution and determines their mutual interdependencies.
2 “This procedure is in accordance with the principle of objectivity requiring that the whole theory
and its interpretations have to be independent of the choice of the units of measurement. And
this requirement is met, if the theory is unit-free, the necessary condition stated in Buckingham’s
P-theorem.” (Schmiechen, 2009, p. 176)
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5 Profit
The business sector’s profit in period t is defined with eq. (7) as the difference
between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with consumption
expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YF3:
Q f i ≡C−YF |t (7)
In explicit form, after the substitution of (3) and (4), this definition is identical
with that of the theory of the firm:
Q f i ≡ PX−WL with ρX = 1 |t (8)
Using the first axiom (1) and the definitions (4) and (5) one gets:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD or Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t (9)
In the pure consumption economy profit is greater than zero if the expenditure
ratio rE is >1 or the distributed profit ratio rD is >0, or both. If distributed profit YD
is set to zero, then profit or loss for the business sector is determined solely by the
expenditure ratio. For the business sector as a whole to make a profit consumption
expenditures C have in the simplest case to be greater than wage income YF. So
that profit comes into existence in the pure consumption economy the household
sector must run a deficit at least over some initial periods. This in turn makes the
inclusion of the financial sector mandatory (see section 11). A theory that does not
include at least a central bank that supports the concomitant credit expansion, which
is covered by eq. (23)4, cannot capture the essential features of the market economy.
Schumpeter was well aware of this (Morishima and Catephores, 1988, p. 42).
It needs hardly emphasis that in the investment economy the process of profit
generation appears more complex. This does not affect the essence of profit but
simply removes the formal necessity that the households have to incur a deficit to
get the economy going. This is then done by the investing business sector. It is not
advisable, though, to tackle the complexities of the investment economy before the
pure consumption economy is fully understood.
3 Profits from changes in the value of non-financial assets are neglected here. One member of this
class is the stock of products which may change with regard to quantity and valuation price if the
product market is not cleared in successive periods. This case is excluded here by the condition
rX=1. For the general case profit has to be introduced with the 5th axiom as the sum of financial and
non-financial profit.
4 When the purchase of long lived consumption goods, e.g. houses, is correctly subsumed under
consumption expenditures there arises no problem with regard to collateral for the banking industry
and a sound credit expansion may proceed for an indefinite time.
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6 A Cognitive Dissonance, But No Contradiction
The determinants of profit look essentially different depending on the perspective.
For the firm price P, quantity X, wage rate W, and employment L in eq. (8) appear
to be all important; under the broader perspective of eq. (9) these variables play no
role at all. The profit definition provokes a cognitive dissonance between the micro
and the macro view.
It is of utmost importance that profit Qfi and distributed profit YD is clearly
distinguished. The latter is a flow of income from the business to the household
sector analogous to wage income. By contrast, profit is the difference of flows
within the business sector. Profit is not connected to a factor input. So far, we have
labor input as the sole factor of production and wage income as the corresponding
factor remuneration. Since the factor capital is nonexistent in the pure consumption
economy, profit cannot be assigned to it in functional terms. And since profit cannot
be counted as factor income (2008, p. 153) there is no place for it in the theory of
income distribution. This would plainly be a category mistake.
The individual firm is blind to the structural relationship as given by eq. (9). On
the firm’s level profit is therefore subjectively interpreted as a reward for innovation
or superior management skills or higher efficiency or toughness on wages or for
risk taking or capitalizing on market imperfections or as the result of monopolistic
practices. These factors play a role when it comes to the distribution of profits be-
tween firms and these phenomena become visible when similar firms of an industry
are compared (see section 8). Business does not ‘make’ profit, it redistributes profit.
The case is perfectly clear when there is only one firm. It is a matter of indifference
whether the firm’s management thinks that it needs profit to cover risks or to finance
growth or whether it realizes the profit maximum or not. If the expenditure ratio
is unity and the distributed profit ratio is zero, profit as defined by eq. (8) will
invariably be zero. The existence of total profit is not explicable by the marginal
principle.
Because of this, it is not wise to take the considerations of the individual firm’s
management as analytical starting-point and then to generalize. The microeconomic
approach is inherently prone to the fallacy of composition. The profit definition
entails a cognitive dissonance between micro and macro, but no logical contradiction.
In fact eq. (8) and (9) are formally equivalent. In the first place, that is, prior to any
distribution between individual firms, total profit is a factor-independent residual
(Ellerman, 1986, pp. 61-65).
Under the condition rE=1 profit Qfi must, as a corollary of eq. (9), be equal
to distributed profit YD. The fundamental difference between the two variables
is not an issue in this limiting case. The equality of profit and distributed profit
is an implicit feature of equilibrium models and of general equilibrium theory in
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particular (Patinkin, 1989, p. 329). Those models cannot find a counterpart in
reality.
In the general case, profit or loss depends on consumer spending and profit
distribution. If in the limiting case distributed profit is zero, then we have three
logical alternatives for the numerical value of the expenditure ratio: rE<1, rE=1
or rE>1. The first alternative entails a loss for the business sector as a whole; the
second means zero profit, and only the third leads to profit which in turn is the
indispensable condition for a reproducible economy. Hence the real question is not
about the existence of a zero-profit equilibrium, but how the market economy can,
and in fact does, avoid this predicament over a longer time span.
The profit definition has another important implication. There is no real residual
that corresponds to the nominal residual profit. Real (O, X) and nominal (Y, C) flows
are to some degree independent. Profit belongs entirely to the nominal sphere, in a
real model it cannot exist. This is the defining characteristic of what Keynes termed
the entrepreneur economy (Rotheim, 1981, pp. 575, 577, 579).
Distributed profit, in contrast, can have a real counterpart. Since the product
market is assumed to be cleared, i.e. rX =1 according to eq. (8), the whole output is
shared between wage earners and the receivers of distributed profit according to their
respective expenditure ratios. Since distributed profit has no relation whatsoever to
the production function the marginal productivity theory of distribution cannot be
true.
7 The Elusive Zero Profit Economy
Schumpeter clearly realized the fundamental theoretical problem with profit, that is,
‘that the laws of cost and marginal productivity seem to exclude it’ (2008, p. 153).
It cannot be said that this problem has been solved in the meantime to everybody’s
satisfaction. The determination and interpretation of profit is ‘one of the most
convoluted and muddled areas in economy theory’ (Mirowski, 1986, p. 234). The
standard argument runs as follows:
[Producing agents] demand the services of the factors of production
from resource owners and supply the final products that enter into
consumption, but under conditions of equilibrium, the relative values
associated with these exchanges leave the producers with a zero profit.
. . . This was, of course, the position of Walras. (Walsh and Gram,
1980, pp. 215, 243)
This was also the position of Karl Schlesinger and Abraham Wald, who essentially
created modern general equilibrium theory (Leonhard, 1995, p. 736). Schumpeter,
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too, defended zero profits: ‘if we are resolved to display the logical properties of
perfect equilibrium in pure competition, Marshall’s profits will in fact vanish as
completely as will Walras’’ (1994, p. 1050); see also (1994, p. 893 fn 3).
Post-Walrasian general equilibrium theory differs in several respects from the
founding fathers. In Debreu’s private ownership economy there is profit and it is
distributed:
. . . the consumers own the resources and control the producers. Thus,
the ith consumer receives the value of his resources . . . and the shares
. . . of the profit of the 1st, . . . , jth, . . . , nth producer. . . . Consider
a private ownership economy E. When the price system is p, the jth
producer tries to maximize his profit on Y j. Suppose that yj does this;
the profit pj(p) = p • yj is distributed to shareholders. (Debreu, 1959,
pp. 78-79)
This result has been contested, for example, by (Walsh and Gram, 1980, pp. 243-
244), (Ellerman, 1986, p. 70), and (Hahn, 1984, p. 79).
In a way Schumpeter solved the problem of profit. He maintained zero profit
for the stationary economy and explained the indubitable fact of continuing positive
profits with the occurrence of disruptive entrepreneurs who, led by the prospect of
extraordinary profits, are keen to carry out new combinations (2008, p. 66). Pure
profit thereby became a disequilibrium phenomenon (1994, p. 1051). Schumpeter
was in accordance with the equilibrium theory of Walras which, however, is no
longer in accordance with the general equilibrium theory of the Arrow-Debreu
type. As the Palgrave Dictionary concludes a comprehensive survey: ‘A satisfactory
theory of profits is still elusive’ (Desai, 2008).
This predicament does not affect the structural axiomatic approach. A separate
profit theory that depends on a perfect competitive equilibrium is not required
because profit is already implicit in the axiom set and is made explicit with eq. (7).
8 Profit and Structural Stress
When two (or more) non-identical firms operate in one market, which is assumed at
the moment, total profits must be greater than zero or the number of firms eventually
shrinks to one. This is obvious, since with zero total profit the profit of one firm is
necessarily outweighed by a loss of the same amount in the other firm.
For two firms total profit is derived from eq. (8) as:
Q f i ≡ (P1X1−W1L1)+(P2X2−W2L2) |t (10)
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To start with the simplest case four conditions are applied: the quantity bought
from each firm is equal to output, i.e. the product market is cleared, and the price,
the wage rate, and employment are identical for both firms:
X1 = O1, X2 = O2 P1 = P2 = P W1 =W2 =W L1 = L2 = Lh |t (11)
Hence it is alone productivity that is different in both firms. Equation (10) thus
reduces to:
Q f i ≡ PLh
(
R1−WP +R2−
W
P
)
if ρX1 = ρX2 = 1 |t (12)
We now ask what the minimum profit for the business sector as a whole must be
under the additional condition that the profit of the firm with the lower productivity
is at least zero. The structural minimum profit that keeps the marginal firm in the
market is:
Qminf i ≡ PLhR2
(
R1
R2
−1
)
if
W
PR2
= 1 |t (13)
The expression on the right hand side states that the factor cost ratio rF≡W/PR
for firm2 is unity or, what amounts to the same, that profit is zero according to eq.
(8). As the two firms can stay in the market total employment L=L1+ L2=2Lh is
maintained. The question of whether the economy is at full employment or not can
be left open at this point (see section 12).
Under the given conditions the minimum profit (13) must be the higher for two
otherwise identical firms the greater the productivity disparity between them. The
degree of heterogeneity is expressed by the productivity ratio rR≡R1/R2. If profit
for the business sector as a whole is below this minimum profit the structure of
the business sector is bound to change. Hence structural stress is a function of the
profit for the business sector as a whole and the degree of heterogeneity within the
business sector. When profit for the business sector is greater than the structural
minimum profit all firms are making profits. A straightforward gauge of structural
stress is given by:
ζ ≡ Q
min
f i
Q f i
|t (14)
If x=0 and Qfi>0 all firms make a profit relative to their size. If x=1 the profit
of the marginal firm is exactly zero, the whole profit accrues in firm1, and with
x>1 structural change sets in. When the structural minimum profit is given, then
structural stress varies inversely with the development of profits for the business
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sector as a whole. With any given total profit the stability of the economy increases
with the degree of homogeneity.
Since productivity differentials are a normal and enduring feature of the econ-
omy profit must be greater than zero in the pure consumption economy and this
means rE>1 at least over some initial periods. This, however, is not a stationary
economy in the sense of Schumpeter (2008, pp. 82-83 fn). To establish one, the
expenditure ratio has to be unity and the following additional condition must hold:
Qminf i = Q = YD (15)
From eq. (9), (13), and (5) then follows for the distributed profit ratio:
ρD =
1
2
(ρR−1) |t (16)
Under this condition the profit of the marginal firm2 is always zero and the profit
of firm1 is identical with the profit for the business sector as a whole. Exactly this
amount is distributed to the households in period t and the same amount is spent
together with wage income on the output of both firms in the stationary economy.
The household sector’s budget is balanced.
We therefore have an economy with more than one firm that is reproducible
in principle for an indefinite time span. This economy is plainly different from
Schumpeter’s zero profit stationary circular flow. Since a zero profit economy is
impossible with two or more firms with different productivities there must be profit
in the stationary economy, too. It is only required that this profit and distributed
profit are equal in each period. To be sure, this is a theoretical limiting case. In the
real world profit and distributed profit are never equal.
From the fact that a positive profit for the business sector as a whole is the
precondition for the existence of the market system with more than one firm it
follows that models that apply the zero profit condition are a priori flawed. Therefore,
Schumpeter’s assertion that there can be no profit in the stationary circular flow
(2008, p. 154), which is here formalized by the axioms of the pure consumption
economy, has to be rejected. Just the opposite is true.
9 Wage Rate Adaptation and Monopolization
When we allow for the differentiation of wages rates in (12) the general condition
for the structural minimum profit reads:
Qminf i ≡ PLhR2
(
R1
R2
−W1
W2
)
if
W2
PR2
= 1 |t (17)
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Structural stress is lowered when the wage ratio rW≡W1/W2 adapts to the
productivity ratio rR. So, either the wage rate in the marginal firm falls or it rises in
the firm with the higher productivity or a combination of the two. In the limiting
case the ratio of wage rates rW thus becomes equal to the ratio of productivities rR.
Then structural stress x is zero and the distribution of profits between both firms is
equal. To exclude side effects, this wage adaptation process should in the ideal case
take place in such a manner that total income remains constant.
When we add the assumption that the law of one price holds for the wage rates
in different firms then this adaptation is ruled out from the outset (2008, p. 145). In
the general case, though, this process is logically and practically possible while the
law of one price is at best a plausible tendency.
Actually wage differentials exist and in principle they may well persist. With
wage reductions the marginal firm can stay in the market and counter the falling
market price that follows according to eq. (20) from the productivity increases of
firm1.
When we add the assumption that the wage differential initiates a migration
from the low-wage firm2 to the high-wage firm1, then the latter grows and the
former shrinks. To exclude side effects, this process should leave total employment
unaffected. The logical result is a monopoly. Total profit stays put in the process
if the expenditure ratio and the distributed profit ratio are kept constant. From this
follows that monopoly is not a separate source of profit. Profit is simply redistributed
from firm2 to firm1 as far as it is above the structural minimum profit. Hence we
cannot adopt Schumpeter’s distinction between entrepreneurial profit and temporary
monopoly revenues (2008, p. 152). They are but two appearances of the same thing.
On the other hand, Schumpeter’s tenet that monopoly is not a priori a bad thing
gets some support. The reallocation of employment between the two firms raises
average productivity and the average wage rate.
The relation of the two variables affects the market clearing price. The price
follows directly from the period core (6) as:
P =
ρE
ρX
(
W
R
+
YD
L
)
|t (18)
The average wage rate W and the average productivity R are given by:
W =W1
L1
L
+W2
L2
L
R = R1
L1
L
+R2
L2
L
(19)
Under the conditions of market clearing, rX=1, and budget balancing, rE=1, the
market clearing price P* results as:
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P∗ =
W
R
+
Qminf i
L
if ρE = ρX = 1 |t (20)
This looks like a mark-up formula (cf. Lavoie, 1992, p. 129), but it is none.
If initial minimum profit and employment are kept constant during the adaptation
process and if average wage rate and average productivity ideally rise in lockstep,
then the market clearing price remains unaltered. The profit of firm1 that was
initially necessary to keep firm2 in the market appears now as monopoly profit. This
profit is fully distributed in each period. Since absolute profit remains constant
and firm1 doubles its size profit per unit falls. Firm1 does not gain much by full
monopolization.
The ultimate result is hardly different when the law of one price is hypothesized.
When the employees migrate without wage differential the average wage rate
remains constant and with an increasing average productivity this entails a lower
market clearing price. The effect on total profit is nil.
Can new entrants drive profit down to zero? No. New entrants can drive down
the market clearing price and redistribute profit in their favor if their productivities
are higher than that of incumbent firms. The profitability of the business sector as a
whole is independent from the number of firms or the absolute size of the economy.
The profit ratio rQ is defined with eq. (21) and this gives a succinct summary of the
structural interrelation of the profit ratio, the expenditure ratio, and the distributed
profit ratio for the business sector as a whole:
ρQ ≡ Q f iY gives ρQ ≡ ρE −
1
1+ρD
|t (21)
The profit ratio for the business sector as a whole is positive if the expenditure
ratio rE is >1 or the distributed profit ratio rD is >0, or both. As long as the
households stick to their spending pattern and firms, new and old, fully distribute
their profits, the profitability of the business sector is not affected by the entry and
exit of firms.
10 The Catching-up Process
Structural stress is reduced and eventually eliminated according to eq. (13) and (14)
when the marginal firm catches up and boosts productivity to the level of firm1.
To elucidate in more detail the role of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur and the
relation between efficiency and profit it is assumed that productivity and everything
else is at first equal in firm1 and firm2. The expenditure ratio is greater than unity,
so both firms make equal profits. Suppose that a process innovation becomes known
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and is implemented (without capital investment) by both firms in the next period.
This increases productivity. Then the price must fall to clear the market according
to eq. (18) and the fruits of organizational progress are directly handed over to the
households. Profits of both firms remain unchanged if the expenditure ratio stays
put. In this case there is no connection at all between efficiency and profit. Hence
it is the time disparity of implementation between firms that is the crucial factor
for the redistribution of the independently given overall profits between firms. The
effect of efficiency improvements on profits is nil if both firms move in lockstep and
it is immaterial whether they move fast or slow.
In contrast to a single-minded profit maximizer an entrepreneur tries to enlarge
the average time disparity between the period of his own implementation and the
periods of his competitors’ implementations. This can be done by directly accelerat-
ing the own implementation and – if possible – decelerating all others. Therefore,
new strategic options have to be adjoined to the standard concept of competition.
It is rational for the firm to impede the dissemination of knowledge about a more
efficient production process and thus time conscious individual rationality gets in
the way of timeless welfare rationality.
Even if the trail blazing Schumpeterian entrepreneur (2008, pp. 132-133) cannot
achieve a lasting redistribution of profits in his favor he almost certainly achieves
‘the acceleration of just about everything’ (Gleick). There is no obvious mechanism
in the system that determines some kind of evolutionary optimum such that the
‘velocity’ as first derivative of economic growth becomes eventually equal to the
marginal costs of obsolescence or destruction for the economy as a whole. The
system simply accelerates with exogenous constraints as upper limits.
The entrepreneur may be formally characterized as the agent who realizes a
productivity ratio rR>1 and thus increases structural stress according to eq. (14) in
conjunction with (13). When he produces too much stress in the pure consumption
economy he may contribute to the irreversible demise of firms and, at least in the
first round, to a drop of employment. The entrepreneur precipitates uncompensated
negative externalities. From the overall welfare perspective the lockstep process is
prefereable.
When we compare the lockstep process with the catching-up process and as-
sume that the ultimate result is the same then the only difference is a temporary
redistribution of profits within the business sector. The households benefit in ei-
ther case from the productivity increase. The ultimate rationale for the stressful
catching-up process is that the implementation of new production methods would
not take place without the promise of temporary above-average profits and the threat
of temporary below-average profits. This leaves open the question of how much
promise and threat is needed (2008, pp. 154-155). We refrain at this point from
further behavioral speculation.
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The invisible hand is supposed to provide ample living space such that relatively
inefficient firms and agents (50 percent by definition at all times of below-average
intelligence, motivation, and management capabilities) can stay in the market in
a full employment economy. This living space is determined by the level of total
profit. The greater the profit-relevant heterogeneity between firms in one market
the higher is the required minimum profit (17) for the economy as a whole. With
regard to the whole economy profit is first of all a structural necessity. Heterogeneity
determines the distribution of total profit among firms but is not its ultimate source.
Schumpeter’s account of profit origination remains on the surface.
11 Money and Credit
The money economy is the real economy. The dichotomization of the real and
the monetary sphere was a central point of Keynes’s methodological critique of
orthodox economics:
The division of economics between the theory of value and distribution
on the one hand and the theory of money on the other hand is, I think,
a false division. (Keynes, 1973, p. 293)
Schumpeter had no qualms with the application of the quantity theory to the sta-
tionary circular flow. For him credit and the creation of new purchasing power
were the distinguishing features of the developing economy because they enable the
entrepreneurs to carry out new combinations (2008, pp. 101-102). Schumpeter gave
an in-depth description of the pivotal role of the banking system. The formal task is
now to show how money consistently follows from the given axiom set.
If income is higher than consumption expenditures the household sector’s stock
of money increases. It decreases when the expenditure ratio rE is greater than unity.
The change of the household sector’s money stock in period t is defined as:
∆MH ≡ Y −C ≡ Y (1−ρE) |t (22)
The stock of money at the end of an arbitrary number of periods is defined as the
numerical integral of the previous changes of the stock plus the initial endowment:
MH ≡
t
∑
t=1
∆MHt +MH0 (23)
The changes in the stock of money as seen from the business sector are symmet-
rical to those of the household sector:
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∆MB ≡C−Y ≡ Y (ρE −1) |t (24)
The business sector’s stock of money at the end of an arbitrary number of
periods is accordingly given by:
MB ≡
t
∑
t=1
∆MBt +MB0 (25)
To simplify matters here it is supposed that all financial transactions are carried
out without costs by the central bank. The stock of money then takes the form of
current deposits or current overdrafts (Wicksell, 1936, p. 70). Initial endowments
can be set to zero. Then, if the household sector owns current deposits according to
eq. (23) the current overdrafts of the business sector are of equal amount according
to eq. (25) and vice versa if the business sector owns current deposits. Money and
credit are symmetrical. The current assets and liabilities of the central bank are
equal by construction. From its perspective the quantity of money at the end of an
arbitrary number of periods is given by the absolute value either from (23) or (25):
Mt ≡
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑t=1∆Mt
∣∣∣∣∣≡
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑t=1Yt (ρEt −1)
∣∣∣∣∣ if M0 = 0 (26)
The quantity of money thus follows directly from the axioms and this implies
for the time being that the central bank plays an accommodative role. Thus it is not
necessary for the firms and households to resort to funds that have been accumulated
before period1. The central bank provides elastic currency roughly in accordance
with the definition of the Federal Reserve Act: ‘Currency that can, by the actions of
the central monetary authority, expand or contract in amount warranted by economic
conditions’.
In the pure consumption economy it is the household sector that takes up credit
if the expenditure ratio rE is >1 in period t. The cumulative development of credit
is given by eq. (23).
12 The Elementary Axiomatic Circular Flow
Schumpeter set the task to construct a ‘simple model displaying all the essential fea-
tures of the economic process by means of a reasonably small number of equations
connecting a reasonably small number of variables’. With the period core (6) the
structural axiomatic approach provides the absolute minimum of equations. Out of
it follows the employment equation:
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L =
YD
PR
ρX
ρE
−W
|t (27)
As a purely formal relationship the period core must hold in each period. Its
new form now implies the additional assumption that employment as dependent
variable is determined by the rest of the system. This is an assumption about the
direction of dependency in a system with complex and mutual interrelations and this
add-on assumption is strictly independent of the axiom set which is clearly open
to various dependency interpretations. Dependency is conceptually different from
causality.
The employment equation states − with the other variables unaltered in each
case:
(A) An increase of the expenditure ratio rE leads to higher employment. An
expenditure ratio rE>1 presupposes the existence of a banking system (see section
11).
(B) An increase of the wage rate leads to higher employment, i.e. to a lower
unemployment rate.
(C) A price increase is conductive to lower employment .
(D) A productivity increase leads to lower employment.
Statements (A) to (D) follow without regress to any behavioral assumptions
from the axiom set and the ‘laws of algebra’ (Shaik, 1980, p. 83). When the axioms
capture reality the logical implications are observable.
The counter-intuitive property (from the accustomed perspective) of the employ-
ment equation is that a wage rate reduction, which lowers the real wage, coincides
with lower employment. This dissonance between standard behavioral assumptions
and structural fact explains why the usual recipe for more employment does not
succeed in getting the economy out of a slump. The microeconomic optimization
calculus and Marshall’s pair of demand/supply scissors – designed for the isolated
partial market – simply do not apply to the economy as a whole. When behavioral
and structural logic are at odds, behavioral logic is conductive to frustrated plans
and expectations. That is the normal state of economic affairs.
With regard to the process of adaptation of employment to changes of the
independent variables eq. (27) implies that the independent variables have to be
fixed at the beginning of the period under consideration. Since the period length is
arbitrary no great distortions arise from this idealization if the length is conveniently
chosen.
The structural axiomatic approach asserts that in the consumption economy
employment is determined solely by the expenditure ratio rE (≡C/Y) and the factor
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cost ratio rF (≡W/PR). This follows from eq. (27) under the conditions that the
product market is cleared, i.e. rX=1, and that the relation of dividend to wage rate
rW is held constant:
L =
DN
PR
ρX
ρE
− W
PR
=
ρW N
ρX
ρE ρF
−1
=
(•)
1
ρE ρF
−1
if ρX = 1, ρW ≡ DW |t (28)
Since employment depends on the expenditure and the factor cost ratio there
obviously exists an arbitrary number of configurations of the two ratios that are
compatible with full employment (however defined). Here we leave open the
question of how full employment could be established (see Kakarot-Handtke, 2011a,
pp. 7-9). Under the conditions that the product market is cleared, i.e. rX=1, and the
household sector’s budget is balanced, i.e. rE=1, the period output is given by:
O = RL =
(•)
P
W
− 1
R
if ρX = ρE = 1 |t (29)
Output depends ultimately on the outcome of the market price mechanism, i.e.
the relation of wage rate, price, and productivity in each period.
The period values of the variables are connected formally by the familiar growth
equation, which is added to the structural set as the fourth axiom:
Zt = Zt−1
(
1+Zt
)
Z |Wt ,Pt ,Rt (30)
The path of the representative variable Zt , which stands for wage rate, price, and
productivity, is then determined by the initial value Z0 and the rates of change Zt
for each period:
Zt = Z0
(
1+Z1
)(
1+Z2
)
. . .
(
1+Zt
)
= Z0
t
∏
t=1
(
1+Zt
)
(31)
Eq. (31) describes the paths of the variables with the rates of change as un-
knowns. These unknowns are in need of determination and explanation. Since we
do not wish to get involved into speculations about human behavior at this stage,
we choose the random hypothesis because:
The simplest hypothesis is that variation is random until the contrary
is shown, the onus of the proof resting on the advocate of the more
complicated hypothesis ... (Kreuzenkamp and McAleer, 1995, p. 12)
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Figure 1: Random Cycles in the Pure Consumption Economy With Market Clearing, Budget Balanc-
ing, and Full Profit Distribution
By feeding eq. (29) with random rates of change for wage rate, price, and produc-
tivity (500 changes between 0%−0.6%, 0%−0.4%, 0%−0.2% respectively) output
in this simple random economy5 develops over time as shown in Figure 1.
Since the product market is cleared and the budget is balanced output changes
depend alone on relative random changes of wage rate W, price P, and productivity
R. It should be noted in passing that Schumpeter held the ‘theory of random events’
in high esteem (1994, p. 448 fn 5), but he did not apply it himself.
From (29) follows that real wage and output are positively related. Productivity
and output are negatively related because a productivity increase has a negative
employment effect. This follows directly from the axiom set and is made explicit
by eq. (27). Schumpeter discussed this effect under the heading of technological
unemployment (2008, p. 250).
Profits and distributed profits are equal in each period. Contrary to Schumpeter,
profit is greater than zero and increases steadily. The chosen simulation comes,
without taking over the Walrasian shortcomings, as close as possible to the elemen-
tary circular flow that served Schumpeter as a backdrop for the description of the
entrepreneurial dynamics of the market system.
5 The term random economy has been introduced for the equilibrium analysis of pure exchange
economies (Föllmer, 1974). It is adopted in the present paper without this specific connotation.
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One phenomenon deserves emphasis. It has been observed by Slutzky (1937,
p. 114) that the summation of random causes may produce cyclic processes in the
economy (and elsewhere). This seems also to be the case for output in Figure 1
although the cyclic pattern does not result from a simple summation but from the
intricate economic structure that is given with eq. (29). This kind of cycles needs
no further explanation in terms of entrepreneurial behavior.
Applying four axioms, the laws of algebra and pure random changes we have
formalized and rectified Schumpeter’s zero profit circular flow in structural ax-
iomatic terms. The ‘reasonably small number of variables’ consists of wage rate,
price, productivity, employment, output, quantity bought, wage income, distributed
profit, consumption expenditures, profit, money, and credit. To establish the in-
terdependencies of these variables is the first and elementary part of the task that
Schumpeter envisioned. The obvious next step is to take capital accumulation into
the picture. This, however, overstretches the format of a paper.
13 Summary and Conclusions
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three non-behavioral axioms as groundwork for the
formal reconstruction of the evolving money economy.
The present paper has three parts. In the first, the logical interdependencies
of the key variables that formally embody the firm, the market, and the income
distribution are identified. In the second, the real world implications for the proper
functioning of the market system are made explicit. In the third, Schumpeter’s
description of the stationary circular flow that is disturbed by the entrepreneurs is
formalized in structural axiomatic terms.
The analytical priority claim of the structural axiomatic approach rests on the
simple fact that, since the structure that is given by the axiom set does not adapt to
behavior, behavior has to adapt to structure. When behavioral and structural logic
are at odds, behavioral logic is conductive to frustrated plans and expectations. That
is the normal state of economic affairs.
The main results of the inquiry are:
• A positive expenditure-income asymmetry is the ultimate structural originator
of profit and therefore the indispensable prerequisite for favorable business
conditions. This holds for the elementary consumption economy and the
complex investment economy in equal measure.
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• In the pure consumption economy total profit of the business sector is greater
than zero if the expenditure ratio is >1 or the distributed profit ratio is >0, or
both.
• Profit is not exclusively a disequilibrium phenomenon as Schumpeter main-
tained.
• The entrepreneur does not create profit; he changes only the distribution of
profits among firms. This holds for the stationary economy as well as for the
developing economy.
• Monopoly revenues are not qualitatively different from entrepreneurial profit
as Schumpeter maintained. They are but two appearances of the same thing.
• When two (or more) non-identical firms operate in one market total profits
must be greater than zero or the number of firms eventually shrinks to one. A
zero profit equilibrium is impossible with more than one firm.
• The minimum profit for the economy as a whole must be the higher the greater
the economically relevant heterogeneity between firms is. If total profit is
lower than the minimum profit structural change sets in and leads to a drop of
employment.
• Models that are based on the collapsed definition total income ≡ wages +
profits are erroneous because profit and distributed profit is not the same
thing.
• The axiomatic Schumpeterian model consists of the variables wage rate,
price, productivity, employment, output, quantity bought, distributed profit,
consumption expenditures, profit, money, credit and their mutual interdepen-
dencies over time.
Applying the axioms, the laws of algebra and pure random changes Schumpeter’s
description of the stationary circular flow has been formalized and turned into a
simple model displaying the essential features of the elementary economic process.
The structural axiomatic approach fits the Schumpeterian approach consistently into
a general context.
References
Ackerman, F. (2004). Still Dead After All These Years: Interpreting the Failure of
General Equilibrium Theory. In F. Ackerman, and A. Nadal (Eds.), The Flawed
Foundations of General Equilibrium, pages 14–32. Milton Park: Routledge.
22
Allen, R. L. (1991). Opening Doors. The Life and Work of Joseph Schumpeter,
volume 1. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Boylan, T. A., and O’Gorman, P. F. (2007). Axiomatization and Formalism in
Economics. Journal of Economic Surveys, 21(2): 426–446.
Chick, V. (1998). On Knowing One’s Place: The Role of Formalism in Economics.
The Economic Journal, 108(451): 1859–1869. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/
2565849.
Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
Desai, M. (2008). Profit and Profit Theory. In The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition. URL http://www.
dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_P000213.
Ellerman, D. P. (1986). Property Appropriation and Economic Theory. In
P. Mirowski (Ed.), The Reconstruction of Economic Theory, pages 41–92. Boston,
MA, Dordrecht, Lancaster: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
Föllmer, H. (1974). Random Economies with Many Interacting Agents. Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 1: 51–62.
Hahn, F. (1981). Review of M. Beenstock: A Neoclassical Analysis of Macroeco-
nomic Policy. Economic Journal, 91(364): 1036–1039.
Hahn, F. (1984). Equilibrium and Macroeconomics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hanusch, H. (1988). Introduction. In H. Hanusch (Ed.), Evolutionary Economics,
pages 1–7. Cambridge, New York, NY, etc.: Cambridge University Press.
Hudson, M. (2010). The Use and Abuse of Mathematical Economics. real-world
economics review, (55): 2–22. URL http://rwer.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/
rwer-issue-55-michael-hudson-math/.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011a). Keynes’s Missing Axioms. SSRN Working Paper
Series, pages 1–29. URL http://ssrn.com/abstract=1841408.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011b). The Pure Logic of Value, Profit, Interest. SSRN
Working Paper Series, pages 1–21. URL http://ssrn.com/abstract=1838203.
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money.
The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke:
Macmillan. (1936).
23
Kirman, A. (1989). The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory: The Emperor
has No Clothes. Economic Journal, Supplement: Conference Papers, 99(395):
126–139. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2234075.
Kirman, A. (2009). Economic Theory and the Crisis. real-world economics review,
(51): 80–83. URL http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue51/Kirman51.pdf.
Kreuzenkamp, H. A., and McAleer, M. (1995). Simplicity, Scientific Inference and
Econometric Modeling. Economic Journal, 105: 1–21. URL http://www.jstor.
org/stable/2235317.
Lavoie, M. (1992). Foundations of Post-Keynesian Economics. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Leonhard, R. J. (1995). From Parlor Games to Social Science: von Neumann,
Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory 1928-1944. Journal of Economic
Literature, 33(2): 730–761. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2729025.
Mill, J. S. (2006). A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected
View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation,
volume 8 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
(1843).
Mirowski, P. (1986). Mathematical Formalism and Economic Explanation. In
P. Mirowski (Ed.), The Reconstruction of Economic Theory, pages 179–240.
Boston, MA, Dordrecht, Lancaster: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
Morishima, M., and Catephores, G. (1988). Anti-Say’s Law versus Say’s Law: A
Change in Paradigm, pages 23–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pålsson Syll, L. (2010). What is (Wrong With) Economic Theory? real-
world economics review, (55): 23–57. URL http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/
issue55Syll55.pdf.
Patinkin, D. (1989). Walras’s Law. In J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman
(Eds.), General Equilibrium, The New Palgrave, pages 328–339. New York, NY,
London: Macmillan.
Popper, K. R. (1980). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London, Melbourne,
Sydney: Hutchison, 10th edition.
Rotheim, R. J. (1981). Keynes’ Monetary Theory of Value (1933). Journal of Post
Keynesian Economics, 3(4): 568–585. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/4537623.
24
Schmiechen, M. (2009). Newton’s Principia and Related ’Principles Revisted.
Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2nd edition.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1946). The Decade of the Twenties. 36(2): 1–10.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1954). Economic Doctrine and Method. London: Allen and
Unwin.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1970). Wesen und Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nation-
alökonomie. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1994). History of Economic Analysis. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Schumpeter, J. A. (2008). The Theory of Economic Development. An Inquiry into
Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle. New Brunswick, NJ,
London: Transaction Publishers. (1934).
Shaik, A. (1980). Laws of Production and Laws of Algebra: Humbug II. In E. J.
Nell (Ed.), Growth, Profits, and Property, pages 80–95. Cambridge, New York,
NY, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Slutzky, E. (1937). The Summation of Random Causes as the Source of Cyclic
Processes. 5(2): 105–146.
Stolper, W. F. (1988). Development: Theory and Empirical Evidence. In H. Hanusch
(Ed.), Evolutionary Economics, pages 9–22. Cambridge, New York, NY, etc.:
Cambridge University Press.
von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O. (2007). Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (1944).
Walsh, V., and Gram, H. (1980). Classical and Neoclassical Theories of General
Equilibrium. New York, NY, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wicksell, K. (1936). Interest and Prices. London: Macmillan.
Correspondence address:
AXEC
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
Hohenzollernstraße 11
80801 Munich, Germany
e-mail: handtke@axec.de
© 2011 Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
25
